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Do campaign contributions from oil and gas companies influence
legislators to vote against the environment, or do these companies
invest in legislators that have a proven antienvironmental voting
record? Using 28 y of campaign contribution data, we find that
evidence consistently supports the investment hypothesis: The
more a given member of Congress votes against environmental
policies, the more contributions they receive from oil and gas com-
panies supporting their reelection.
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The role of money in politics has long been a focus of researchin political science (1, 2). One explanation for campaign
contributions to Congress is to buy influence (i.e., the “influence
hypothesis”). That is, companies contribute to the campaigns of
those running for Congress with the expectation that those
candidates, if elected, will vote in ways aligned with the interests
of the companies.
For example, in an analysis of trade policy, Baldwin and
Magee (3) concluded that campaign contributions influenced
elected officials’ votes on the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Uruguay Round Agreement. Furthermore,
recent experimental research shows that campaign contributions
can be used to purchase access to congressional officials (4).
On the other hand, other research often finds that, rather than
attempting to influence votes, interested parties contribute the most
to legislators that have policy positions that are already aligned with
the interested party (5, 6). Similarly, in their extensive review of
theories of lobbying, Hall and Deardorff (7) argue that interested
parties do not necessarily attempt to change the minds of undecided
or opposing legislators but instead support aligned legislators in
fulfilling their policy goals (i.e., the “investment hypothesis”; also
see ref. 8).
The influence (or investment) of money in politics has taken
on new importance in the United States with the Citizens United
versus Federal Election Commission Supreme Court decision in
2010. With the Citizens United decision, the court ruled that the
First Amendment to the US Constitution protects independent
spending for political communications by for-profit corporations,
nonprofit corporations, and labor unions.
Large corporations have taken full advantage of this “money as
speech” court decision. In particular, we focus here on oil and gas
companies, who contributed more than $84 million to candidates
running for the US Congress in 2018 (9). This is more than a
twofold increase since the Citizens United decision in 2010, when
oil and gas companies contributed approximately $35 million to
candidates. While the absolute value of these contributions may
seem relatively small, the doubling is noteworthy because it oc-
curred in conjunction with the allowance of unlimited election
spending by corporations and labor unions through the estab-
lishment of “independent expenditure-only committees,” or Super
PACs. Thus, it is important to investigate how this money may
influence legislators’ voting behavior on environmental issues.
The difficulty in assessing causal claims about influence or
investment is the inability to randomly assign campaign contri-
butions or congressional votes, leading most studies to rely on
cross-sectional data. However, some methods increase confi-
dence in causal explanations to the extent that they can establish
correlation, temporal precedence, and distinguish between
competing explanations. Such a technique is cross-lagged panel
analysis (e.g., ref. 10). This enables analyses of changes in con-
gressional votes as a function of contributions to campaigns from
the preceding years, and vice versa. Here, we use cross-lagged
panel analysis to evaluate whether the data support the influence
hypothesis, investment hypothesis, or both. To do so, we ana-
lyzed 14 pairs of consecutive election cycles (1990 to 2018). To
test these hypotheses, we gathered data on campaign contribu-
tions from the Center for Responsive Politics and matched it
with congressional voting records coded as being either in favor
of or against environmental policies, according to the League of
Conservation Voters (LCV). We collected all possible records
on both variables from 1990 to 2018.
Results consistently support the investment hypothesis. In
13 out of 14 analyses, lower LCV scores (i.e., more anti-
environmental votes) in one election cycle predicted significantly
increased contributions in the following election cycle (Fig. 1,
Left). For example, the strongest result was observed for the
2016 election: For every additional 10% of congressional votes
against the environment in 2014, a legislator would receive an
additional $5,400 in campaign contributions from oil and gas
companies in 2016 (b = −0.54, SE = 0.12; P < 0.001; 95% CI
[−0.77, −0.31]). This is an especially strong relationship consid-
ering that many elected officials vote against environmental
policies nearly 100% of the time, thereby compounding the cycle
of antienvironmentalism and increasing rewards in the form of
contributions.
There were 2 of 14 analyses that were significant in support of
the influence hypothesis, but the magnitude of the effects was
small (Fig. 1, Right). For example, the strongest relationship in
favor of the influence hypothesis shows that, for every $10,000
received in contributions in 2004, a legislator would be expected
to vote against environmental policies an additional 1% of
the time in 2006 (b = −0.11, SE = 0.04; P = 0.009; 95% CI
[−0.21, −0.02]).
To compute a more precise estimate of the support for the
investment versus the influence hypothesis, we conducted two
random-effects metaanalyses. Results show strong metaanalytic
support for the investment hypothesis such that, on average,
every 10% decrease in LCV score in one election cycle predicted
an additional $1,700 in campaign contributions from oil and gas
companies in the following election cycle (b = −0.17; 95% CI
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[−0.23, −0.12]). On the other hand, there was weak but significant
metaanalytic support for the influence hypothesis (b = −0.01; 95%
CI [−0.03, −0.00]).
These findings provide strong and consistent support for the
investment hypothesis and weak and inconsistent support for
the influence hypothesis. That is, instead of attempting to sway
undecided or opposing legislators’ votes, oil and gas companies
seem to provide financial rewards to members of Congress after
they have voted against legislation to protect the environment.
The current findings provide stronger evidence for the exis-
tence of this reward system compared to past cross-sectional
research, which has heavily relied on single time points (3). In
contrast, our models use time series to demonstrate temporal
precedence and allow for robustness tests across 14 pairs of
election years.
Although results from this analysis indicate that money is used
by oil and gas companies to systemically support antienvironmental
politicians, these insights likely generalize to other areas of monied
interests, such as those in the technological, financial, and phar-
maceutical industries. The current findings provide an important
step toward better understanding the role of campaign contribu-
tions in voting on environmental issues.
Method
Data Collection. Data on campaign contributions were collected from the Center
for Responsive Politics (CRP) via OpenSecrets.org (9). We downloaded all contri-
butions data for each year and selected contributions from oil and gas companies
based on the CRP industry codes. We then downloaded scores from the LCV,
which provide scores (0 to 100%) on how members of Congress vote on envi-
ronmental issues (11). We thenmatched campaign contributions to LCV scores for
each member of Congress. The data are available on our Open Science Frame-
work project page at https://osf.io/m6rcg/ (12).
Data Cleaning and Analysis. After gathering contributions data from CRP, we
assigned the value of zero to any member of Congress that had no record of
receiving a contribution from an oil or gas company that year. For ease of
interpretation, contribution values were rescaled to increments of $10,000 by
dividing values by 10,000. Likewise, LCV scores were rescaled to increments of
10 by dividing values by 10.
Cross-lagged panel analyses were run in STATA 15’s SEM module for each
consecutive pair of election years from 1990 to 2018 (i.e., 1990 to 1992 . . . 2016
to 2018). That is, contributions and LCV scores from one election year were
modeled to predict the same variables, as well as each other, in the following
election year. Hence, analyses were restricted to members of Congress that
remained in office for more than one term so that changes in contributions
and voting behavior were possible to observe. All models were estimated
using maximum likelihood with bootstrap SEs and 1,000 bootstrap samples.
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Fig. 1. Coefficients and 95% CIs for tests of investment (Left) and influence (Right) hypotheses and their corresponding metaanalytic effects for the years
1992 to 2018.
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